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IN RE HESS
[45 C.:!d 171; 288 P.2d 5]

[Crim. No. 5672.

In Bank.

Oct. 4, 1955.]

In re TROY CLIFFORD HESS on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The
offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not
necessarily included in the offense of rape, since rape of the
kinds described in Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2-6, can be committed on a woman 21 years of age or more.
[2] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Under Pen.
Code, § 654, relating to acts made punishable in different ways
by different provisions of such code, double punishment for
rape would be improper regardless of whether there is but one
offense or six different offenses of rape.
[S] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing
another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.
[4] Id.-Pormer Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Since forcible
rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) can be committed without
eontributing to the delinquency of a minor, the offense of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not necessarily
included in forcible rape.
[6] Indictment and Information-Oharging Offense-Necessity.-A.
person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a necessarily included offense) not charged against him by indictment
or information, whether or not there was evidence at his trial
to show that he had committed that offense.
[6] Id.-Oharging Offense-Necessity.-Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him
in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by
evidence offered at his trial.
['1&. 7b] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds-Defective Accusatory Pleading.
-Where it appears from the judgment roll that the offense of
eontributing to the delinquency of a minor was not charged
against defendant in the information, that such offense is not
necessarily included in the offense of forcible rape that was
chargcd therein, and that the trial court therefore actcd in
excess of its jurisdiction in entering a judgment of conviction
of that offense against defendant, his imprisonment under that

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 179 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimil;tal

Law, §§ 386, 388.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Criminal Law, § 144; [5, 6J Indietment and Information, § 22; [7] Habeas Corpus, § 22(2); [8]
Habeas Corpus, §§ 61,65; [9] Criminal Law, § 111.
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judgment is unlawful and he is entitled to be discharged on
hahea!) corpus.
[8] ld.-Hearing-Presumptions: Discharge and Remand.-Where
defendant was charged with and tried for forcible rape but
was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
• it mus~ be presumed on habeas corpus that the jury concluded
that he was not guilty of forcible rape before they considered
whether he should be convicted of what they erroneously
believed to be a lesser included offense, and accordingly, by
finding him guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, being in the terms of the verdict "a lesser offense
included in the offense charged in the information," the jury
acquitted defendant of the offense charged, and with respect
to that charge he is entitled to his release and need not be
remanded to the custody of the sheriff of the county in which
he was tried. (Overruling People v. Ourtis, 76 Cal. 57, 11
P. 541, which held such a verdict was a nullity for all purposes.)
[9] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Waiver.-Where a defendant charged with forcible rape was improperly found guilty
of the unpleaded offense of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, but he failed to object to the entry of judgment
on the defective verdict and collaterally attacked the judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding, he impliedly waived any
objection to being retried on the unpleaded charge j and neither
the granting of habeas corpus nor the improper conviction
would prevent his being properly charged and tried for the
unpleaded offense, even if he had been in jeopardy with respect
to that offense.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ granted.
Bruce A. Werlhof and Robert W. Trimble for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In April 1954, petitioner, who was then
17 years of age, was charged by an information with "the
crime of RAPE, a felony, in violation of Section 261, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code of the State of California
(Forcible), committed as follows:
"The said 'rROY CLII~FOHD lIESS, on or about the 11th day
of April A.D. 1954, in the said County of EI Dorado, in the
said. State of California, aud before th~ tiling of this informa-
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tion, dld then and there ,villfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
and with force and violence, have and accomplish an act of
sexua1 illtcJ:,course with and upon . . . ., a female person,
who was not then and there the wife of the said defendant,
Troy Clifford Hess, without the consent and against the will
of the said •.•., and she, the said . . . ., then and there
resisted the accomplishment of said act of sexual intercourse,
but her resistance was then and there overcome by force and
violence used upon and against the said . . . ., by said defendant, Troy Clifford Hess." (Name of alleged victim
deleted.)
The jury returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. (WeIf. & Inst.
Code, § 702.) A judgment of conviction was entered on the
verdict, and petitioner was committed to the Youth Authority
for the time prescribed by law. He did not appeal and the
judgment became final. He now seeks his discharge on habeas
corpus.
Petitioner contends that he was acquitted of the charge
of forcible rape, that contributing to the delinquency of a
minor is not an offense necessarily included in the crime
of rape, and that the court therefore acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in entering a Judgment of conviction of that
offense against him.
[1] In support of his contention that defendant's conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor was proper
on the ground that that offense is necessarily included in the
offense with which he was charged, respondent makes the
following argument: (1) there is but one crime of rape, and
the six subdivisions of section 261 of the Penal Code merely
state six different ways of committing the same crime. (People
v. Oraig, 17 Cal.2d 453,455 [110 P.2d 403]) ; (2) contributing
to the delinquency of a minor is necessarily included in a
charge of statutory rape (PeopZe v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 596
[184 P.2d 512]); (3) therefore, contributing to the delinquency of a minor is necessarily included in the crime of rape,
regardless of which of the subdivisions of section 261 defendant
is alleged to have violated. This argument is internally inconsistent and self-destructive. If all of the definitions of
rape must be considered in determining hat are necessarily
included offenses, the conclusion is inescapable that contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not a necessarily
included offense since rape of the kinds described in sub-

divisions 2-6 of section 261 could be committed on a woman

...
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21 years of age or more. Thus, to accept respondent's argument would create an inconsistency with a series of cases
(People v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 597-598 and cases
cited; People v. Chapman, 81 Cal.App.2d 857, 863-866 [185
P.~d 424]) holding that contributing to the delinquency of a
minor is necessarily included in statutory rape, for those
cases are based on the premise that statutory rape is a special
kind of rape and that every commission of that offense will
contribute to the delinquency of a minor.
Nor are the holdings in those cases inconsistent with the
holding in In re Craig, supra, 17 Ca1.2d 453. In that case
it was held that the defendant could not be convicted on two
counts merely because he committed a forcible rape on a
victim under 18 years of age. Although it was stated in the
Craig case that the six subdivisions of section 261 of the
Penal Code" merely define the circumstances under which an
act of intercourse may be deemed an act of rape; they are
not to be construed as creating several offenses of rape based
upon that single act' 1 (17 Ca1.2d at 455), that statement must
be read in light of the problem then before the court, that
is, whether the defendant could be doubly punished for a
single act. [2] Under section 654 of the Penal Code it is
clear that double punishment would be improper (In re
Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385, 389-390 [273 P.2d 817]; People v.
Knowles, 35 Ca1.2d 175, 187-189 [217 P.2d 1]; People v.
Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555, 561-563 [191 P .2d 1]), regardless
of whether there is but one offense or six different offenses of
rape.
Section 1159 of the Penal Code provides that "The jury
may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission
of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged. . . . " [3] "The test in this state of a necessarily
included offense is simply that where an offense cannot be
committed without necessarily committing another offense.
the latter is a necessarily included offense." (People v. Greer,
30 Ca1.2d 589, 596 [184 P.2d 512J ; see also People v. Kehoe,
33 Ca1.2d 711, 713 [204 P.2d 321].) [4] Forcible rape
(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), can be committed without contributing to the delinquency of a minor, e. g., forcible rape
of a woman 21 years of age or more. The latter offense,
therefore, is not necessarily included in the former. (People v.
Kennedy, 133 Cal.App.2d 693, 694 [284 P.2d 898].)
[5] A person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than
a necessarily included offense) not charged against him by
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indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence
at his trial to show that he had committed that offense.
(People v. Sm·ith, 136 Cal. 207,&208 [68 P. 702] ; People v.
Arnett, 126 Cal. 680, 681 [59 P. 204]; People v. Wallace,
9 Cal. 30, 32; In re Oolford, 68 Cal.App. 308, 311 [229 P. 63] ;
People v. Arnarez, 68 Cal.App. 645, 648, 651 [230 P. 193] ;
People v. Akens, 25 Cal.App. 373, 376 [143 P. 795] ; see also
People v. Mahony, 145 Cal. 104, 107-109 [78 P. 354]; Pen.
Code, §§ 950, subd. 2, 1159, 1426.) The information charging
forcible rape in the present case did not advise petitioner that
he must be prepared to controvert evidence that his alleged
victim was under the age of 21 years and to defend a charge
of having committed an act that would tend "to cause or
encourage any person under the age of 21 years" to become
a delinquent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; see also People v.
Lamanuzzi,77 Cal.App. 301, 303-304 [246 P. 557] ; People v.
Salisbury, 59 Cal.App. 299, 300-301 [210 P. 642] ; People v.
Akens, supra, 25 Cal.App. 373, 374-375.) [6] Due process
of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges
against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken
by surprise by evidence offered at his trial. (In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 [68 8.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682]; Oooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536-537 [45 8. Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed.
767] ; In re Digiuro, 100 Cal.App.2d 260, 261 [223 P.2d 263];
see also People v. Robinson, 107 Cal.App. 211, 217 [290 P.
470] .)
[7aJ Since it appears from the judgment roll (cf. In re
Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 500-505 [122 P.2d 22]) that the offense
of contributing to the delinqu~ncy of a minor was not charged
against petitioner in the information, that it is not necessarily
included in the offense that was charged therein, and that
the court therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction in entering a judgment of conviction of that offense against him, his
imprisonment under that judgment of conviction is unlawful.
[8] It is contended, however, that petitioner is not entitled
to be discharged but must be remanded to the custody of the
sheriff of the county in which he was tried since the warrant
under which he was held by that sheriff has not been superseded by a valid judgment of conviction or acquittal. (In·re
McOoy, 32 Cal.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531].) Had the offense
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor been an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged, the verdict finding
petitioner guilty of the former offense would have constituted
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an acquittal of the latter. (People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 598
[184 P.2d 512], and cases cited.) Moreover, in such a case,
by attacking the validity of the conviction for the lesser offense,
petitioner would not waive his right to rely on that acquittal
a~ a binding adjudication that he was not guilty of the greater
offense charged. (People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227, 229-232 [33
P. 901] ; People v. McFarlane, ·138 Cal. 481, 486 [71 P. 568,
72 P. 48, 61 L.R.A. 245] ; People v. Smith, 134 Cal. 453, 455
[66 P. 669]; People v. Apgar, 35 Cal. 389, 391; People v.
Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376, 377 [60 Am.Dec. 620].) This rule is
based on the theory that the jury, by returning a verdict of
guilty of the lesser offense returns an implied verdict of not
guilty of the greater offense, and that any error affecting the
express verdict of guilty does not affect the conclusiveness of
the implied verdict of acquittal. (People v. Gordon, supra;
People v. Gilmore, supra.) The theory of these cases is equally
applicable in the present case. Petitioner was charged with
and tried for the crime of forcible rape, and it must be
presumed that the jury concluded that he was not guilty of
that offense before they considered whether he should be
convicted of what they erroneously believed to be a lesser
included offense. Accordingly, by finding defendant guilty
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, being in the
terms of the verdict, "a lesser offense included in the offense
charged in the information," the jury acquitted defendant of
the offense charged, and with respect to that charge he is
entitled to his release. People v. Ourtis, 76 Cal. 57 [17 P.
941], which held that a verdiet of guilty of an offense neither
charged nor included in t11e offense charged in the information
was a nullity for all purposes, is inconsistent with the reasoning of the cases cited above and is overruled.
[9] Finally it should be noted that neither the granting
of the writ in this case nor petitioner's invalid conviction
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor will prevent
his being properly charged with and tried for that offense.
Even if it is assumed that he has been in jeopardy with
respect to such contributing, despite the failure of the information to charge that offense or one in which it was included,
by failing to object to the entry of judgment on the defective
yerdict and by collaterally attacking the judgment in this
proceeding petitioner has impliedly waived any objection to
being retried on the charge of which he was improperly convicted. (People v. llam Tong, 155 Cal. 579, 581-584 [102
P. 263, 132 Am.St.Hep. 110, 24 L.R.A.N.S. 481]; People v.

)
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Travers, 73 Cal. 580, 582 [15 P. 293] ; People v. Murat, 45
Cal. 281, 285; People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118, 122 [22 P.2d
526] ; People v. Sachau, 78 Cal.App. 702, 705-709 [248 P.
960] ; In re Colford, supra, 68 Cal.App. 308, 311-312; In re
Davis, 68 Cal.App. 801 [229 P. 1114] ; In re Evans, 68 Cal.
App.802 [229 P.1114].)
[7b] The writ of habeas corpus is granted, the return to
the order to show cause shall stand as the return to the writ,
the petitioner is discharged, and his bail is exonerated.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spenee, J.,
eoncurred.
EDMONDS, J.-In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589 [184
P.2d 512], the defendant had been tried upon separate charges
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (WeIf. & Inst.
Code, § 702) and "violations of Penal Code, sections 261(1)
(statutory rape) and 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct)." He
was convicted of contributing to delinquency but the jurors
disagreed as to the other offenses. In the second trial, he
pleaded double jeopardy as a bar to further prosecution
upon the charges as to which the former jury had disagreed.
This court reversed a judgment of conviction for failure of
the trial court to allow proof of the former prosecution. "It
is true," said the court, "that each offense is stated differently
in the codes and that defendant could have contributed to the
delinquency of a minor without committing statutory rape or
a lewd and lascivious act. (Citation.) Nevertheless, the converse is not true. We are holding, not that these offenses are
identical, but that every violation of sections 261 (1) and 288
necessarily constitutes a violation of section 702 and that
therefore the offense defined in section 702 is an offense necessarily included in the offenses defined in sections 261(1) and
288." (30 Cal.2d p. 598.)
In effect, if not explicitly, the Greer case holds that statutory
rape, as defined in section 261, subd. 1, of the Penal Code
is a specific offense of which one may be convicted. No other
conclusion would support the result reached, because the
offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor would
not necessarily be established by proof of conduct which wpuld
support a conviction of rape under the circumstances enumerated in the other subsections of section 261. However, in
People v. Craig, 17 Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403], this court held
that section 261 specifies only one criminal offense which may

..
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be committed under the different circumstances enumerated
in the subsections.
Upon this analysis of section 261, Craig's conviction of two
counts of rape was reversed as to one of them because both
were based upon the one act of forcible intercourse committed
with a 16-year-old girl. The court said: "Under this section
[Pen. Code, § 261], but one punishable offense of rape results
from a single act of intercourse, although that act may be
accomplished under more than one of the conditions or circumstances specified in the foregoing subdivisions. These subdivisions merely define the circumstances under which an act
of intercourse may be deemed an act of rape; they are not
to be construed as creating several offenses of rape based
upon that single act." (P. 455.) Quoting from People v.
Venable, 25 Cal.App.2d 73 [76 P.2d 523], the court stated
the test for determining "whether one or more offenses result
from a single act or transaction," as being" 'the identity of
tke offenses as distinguished from the identity of the transactions from which they arise. A defendant may be convicted
of two separate offenses arising out of the same transaction
when each offense is stated in a separate count and when the
two offenses differ in their necessary elements and one is
not included within the other. " (P.457.)
In the Craig case, the court rejected the argument that four
separate offenses are specified by section 261 and distinguished
cases in which convictions for two or more offenses arising
out of the same act were upheld. "In the cited instances,
the one act or transaction either injured or affected two or
more victims or ran counter to two or more separate and distinct statutes defining different crimes with different elements.
In many instances the violation of these separate statutes was
complete at different stages of commission of the single act or
transaction. . . . But none of the foregoing distinguishable
characteristics is here present. There is only one victim.
There has been a violation of but one statute-section 261 of
the Penal Code. And, while the proof necessarily varies with
respect to the several subdivisions of that section under which
the charge may be brought, the sole punishable offense under
any and all of them is the unlawful intercourse with the
victim. " (P. 458.)
Certaiuly, rape committed upon an adult bas nothing whatever to do with contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
and one is not giVPll adeqnate llotice of the possibility of being
prosecuted for the latter OiICllSC by an indictment which

-~
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charges forcible rape. For that reason, I concur in the
judgment. However, in my opinion, the distinction drawn by
the majority between the Craig and Greer cases does not
fully resolve the apparent conflict between those two decisions.
Although they were decided on different factual bases, they
state conflicting definitions of the offense of rape. The definition of an offense is important both to the state and to the
accused, and conflicts in definition should be eliminated.
SHENK, J .-1 dissent.
The petitioner was charged with forcible rape as denounced by subdivision 3 of section 261 of the Penal Code.
Upon his plea of not guilty the cause went to trial before
a jury. As revealed by the record, the petitioner stated
that he, with the prosecuting witness and some other young
people, parked their car near the side of a mountain road
in El Dorado County; that he was left alone in the car with
the prosecuting witness and that they moved into the back
seat of the car; that" necking" and "fondling" were engaged
in willingly by the girl, culminating in a voluntary act of
sexual intercourse. The prosecuting witness stated that she
entered the back seat willingly, but immediately remonstrated
with the petitioner to discontinue his advances; that instead
of following her request he became more brutal and aggressive, bruising her neck, face, ribs, and forcibly consummating
an act of intercourse.
The trial court instructed the jury that contributing to
the delinquency of a minor as denounced by section 702 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code was a crime included
within the offense charged in the information. The evidence
was sufficient to support a conviction of forcible rape as
charged; but the jury, obviously choosing to relieve the petitioner of the more serious charge, found him c, guilty of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of
section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State
of California, being a lesser offense included in the offense
charged in the information."
Under the law of this state the trial court was justified in
so instructing the jury, and in turn it was within the province
of the jury to follow those instructions and return the veldict
in the form quoted. It is only by specious reasoning and
overruling former cases in this state on the subject that the
majority has ordered the release of the petitioner.
Section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions (J(,(b provides
)
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that any person who commits an act which causes or tends

to cause or encourage any person under the age of 21 years
to come within the provisions of any of the subdivisions of
section 700 is guilty of a misdemeanor. Subdivision k of
section 700 includes anyone "who is leading, or from any
cd.use is in danger of leading, an idle, dissolute, lewd, or
immoral life." A voluntary act of sexual intercourse with
a female under the age of 21 years is unquestionably sufficient
to bring the petitioner within section 702. (See People v.
Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512] ; People v. Young, 44
Cal.App. 279 [186 P. 383] ; People v. Oamp, 42 Cal.App. 411
[183 P. 845]; 15 Cal.Jur.2d, Delinquent Children, § 29.)
The question then is whether the offense against a female
under the age of 21 years is a crime included within the crime
of rape as denounced in section 261 of the Penal Code.
Penal Code, section 1159, as amended in 1951 provides that
"The jury, or the judge if a jury is waived, may find the
defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is
necessarily included in that with which he is charged. . .. "
In People v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589, at page 596, it was
said by Mr. Justice Traynor for an unanimous court that
"The test in this state of a necessarily included offense is
simply that where an offense cannot be committed without
necessarily committillg another offense, the latter is a necessarily incI uded offense." The majority view of the present
case stands or falls on the statement in the opinion that
"Forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3) can be committed
without contributing to the delinquency of a minor, e.g.,
forcible rape of a woman 21 years of age or more." That
statement is obviously correct as it stands, but it is not responsive to the issue. It incorrectly assumes that there is a
distinct crime of forcible rape separable from the other situations enumerated in section 261 describing the crime of
"rape. "
Under section 261 there is but one crime of rape although
the condemned act may be committed under any of the various
conditions specified ill the several subdivisions of the section.
In People v. Cra'ig, 17 Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403], it was said
at page 455: "These subdivisions merely define the circumstances under which an act of intercourse may be deemed an
act of rape; they are not to be construed as creating several
offenses of rape based upon that single act." The essential
guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the per~on of the
female. (Pen. Code, § 263.) lIenee the rule was COl'rectIy

)
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stated in People v. Snyder, 75 Cal. 323 at pages 324-325 [17
P. 208]: "We think the true construction of section 261
to be that thereby the legislature ~eant merely to put beyond
doubt the rule that on an information for rape the things
mentioned in the subdivisions could be proven, and would
establish the crime. It is not intended to alter or establish
a rule of pleading; or to create six different kinds of crime.
Now, as before the adoption of the code, under an indictment
similar to the information in this case, any of the matters
mentioned in section 261 may be proved. They are included
in the words 'by force and violence, and against her will,'
and 'did feloniously ravish.' •• ."
(See People v. Oraig,
supra, 17 Ca1.2d 453; People v. Jailles, 146 Cal. 301 [79 P.
965] ; People v. Vann, 129 Cal. 118 [61 P. 776].) Guided by
these consistently followed principles, our courts have held
that evidence tending to show a violation of subdivision 4
where the female is prevented from resisting by threats of
harm or administration of narcotics, is admissible to support
an allegation and conviction under subdivision 3, where the
female resists but her resistance is overcome by force or
violence. (People v. Snyder, supra, 75 Cal. 323; People v.
Tollack, 105 Cal.App.2d 169 [233 P.2d 121] ; People v. Blankenship, 103 Cal.App.2d 60 [228 P.2d 835] ; People v. Oassandras, 83 Cal.App.2d 272 [188 P.2d 546]); and that evidence tending to show a violation of subdivision 3 is admissible
to support an allegation and conviction under subdivision 2
where the female is incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind of giving legal consent. (People v. Boggs,
107 Cal.App. 492 [290 P. 618].) In People v. Jailles, supra,
146 Cal. 301, the foregoing principles were applied to the
problem here involved. There it is stated that an allegation
of forcible rape under subdivision 3 is sufficient to support a
conviction on evidence showing a violation of section 261,
subdivision 1, voluntary intercourse where the female is under
the statutory age. (See also People v. Vann, supra, 129
Cal. 118.)
In the foregoing cases the allegation in the information of
a specific subdivision of the code seems at most to indicate
only the prosecutor's initial theory of the case. By no means
is the court or jury bound to remain within the bounds of
that theory as stated. For the purpose of determining questions of adequate notice and included offenses, an information
charging the violation of a particular subdivision of section
261 must be deemed to charge the general crime of rape as
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defined in its various circumstances stated in that section
as a whole. Since in the present case the petitioner was
eharged with violating section 261, subdivision 3, he was subject to conviction of rape under section 261, subdivision 1,
involving voluntary intercourse with female under the statutbryage. (People v. Jailles, supra, 146 Cal. 301.)
When the petitioner's liability is comprehended within
subdivision 1, it is clear that the majority view in the present
ease is directly contrary to the opinion of this eourt in People
v. Greer, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 589. In that case it was necessary
to determine whether a section 702 violation was included
within section 261, subdivision 1, for double jeopardy purposes. Greer had been previously convicted of violating seetion 702. Upon his subsequent eonviction of rape under
seetion 261, subdivision 1, this court reversed, holding that
the offense stated in section 702 was an offense necessarily
included within section 261. subdivision 1. In reaching that
result it was stated at pages 597-598: "Statutory rape
(§ 261 (1» and lewd and lascivious conduct (§ 288) are
offenses against minors under 18 and 14 years of age, respectively, whereas section 702 protects minors under 21.
Consequently, the age groups covered by sections 261(1)
and 288 of the Penal Code are necessarily included within the age group covered by section 702 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. It is inconceivable that the acts described in sections 261 (1) and 288 would not contribute to
the delinquency of a minor. (See Rodriguez v. Superior
Oourt, 27 Cal.2d 500, 502 [165 P.2d 1]; People v. Tenner,
67 Cal.App.2d 360, 366 [154 P.2d 9] ; People v. Krupa, 64
Cal.App.2d 592, 601 [149 P.2d 416] at 601.) Since every
violation of sections 261 (1) and 288 is also a violation of
section 702, the offense defined in the latter is an offense
necessarily included in the offenses defined in sections 261 (1)
and 288. (People v. Lopez, 46 Cal.App.2d 857, 858 [117 P.2d
10].) . . . It is true that each offense is stated differently in
the codes and that defendant could have contributed to the
delinquency of a minor without committing statutory rape
or a lewd and lascivious act . . . . Nevertheless, the converse
is not true. Weare holding, not that these offenses are
identical, but that every violation of sections 261(1) and 288
necessarily constituteg a violation of section 702 and that
therefore the offense defined in section 702 is an offense necessarily included in the offenses dE-fined in sections 261 (1)
and 288." The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the
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rule now announced by the majority cannot be reconciled
with our holding ill the Greer case.
Nor is it consequential that the victim's age in the present
case appears to be IS years and therefore beyond the age
protected under section 261, subdivision 1. The actual age
of the victim, as revealed by the evidence, does not control
the determination of included offense problems. Under the
rule stated in the Greer case, the test is whether the lesser
offense, as a legal proposition, is included within the greater
offense. The actual age of the victim as revealed by the
evidence is not important for any purpose other than determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction
under section 702, a matter not here involved. By charging
forcible rape, the information implicitly but clearly incorporated the crime of rape by voluntary intercourse with a
female under the statutory age aud hence put the petitioner
on notice that the age of his victim was an issue properly
within the case.
The writ should be denied.

